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Directors:
Randolph E. Bank
Philip E. Gill
Michael Holst

Administrative Contact:
Jennifer Trefftzs

Office: AP&M 7409
Phone: (858)534-9056
Fax: (858)534-5273
E-mail: jtrefftzs@ucsd.edu
Nash Equilibrium Problems

Jiawang Nie
Department of Mathematics, UCSD

Abstract:

Nash equilibrium problems (NEPs) are games for several players . A Nash Equilibrium (NE) is a tuple of strategies such that each player's benefits cannot be improved when the other players' strategies are fixed. For NEPs given by polynomial functions, we formulate efficient polynomial optimization problems for computing NEs. The Moment-SOS relaxations are used to solve them. Under genericity assumptions, the method can find a Nash equilibrium if there is one; it can also find all NEs if there are finitely many ones. The method can also detect nonexistence if there is no NE. This is a joint work with Dr. Xindong Tang.

Tuesday, April 12, 2022
11:00AM Zoom Meeting ID: 954 6624 3503